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 The art of governing well has to be learned. "?Walter Lippmann
 Pluralism, Multiculturalism and Group Rights
 by Chandran Kukathas
 However prevalent may have been the longing for homogeneity,
 or at least social unity, in political thinking, the fundamental point
 which must be recognized is that cultural diversity or pluralism has
 been the most notable feature of society in the history of human set
 tlement. "Marginality and pluralism were and are the norm of civi
 lized existence."1 There are several reasons why this is the pattern
 revealed by history.2 The first has to do with the ubiquity of military
 conflict. Even among barbarians ethnic political unity was fragile
 because military conquests resulted in the mixing of peoples. But
 throughout history the military ventures of both nomadic and civi
 lized peoples ensured a continual mingling of aben peoples. A sec
 ond factor which contributed to this mingling was trade, which
 developed further with greater specialization and the division of
 labor.3 Thirdly, disease, in its impact on health and mortality in
 urban centers had a profound demographic effect: the loss of popu
 lations and labor shortages meant that cities were forced to look
 outside for replacement?to immigrants, to guest workers, and to
 slaves. Finally, the rise of universalist religions such as Islam,
 Buddhism and Christianity served to further transform distant cul
 tures with foreign ideas and foreign visitors.
 The consequence of all this for modern societies is that while
 many nations may have their origins in some particular ethnic her
 itage, scarcely a handful are in any sense ethnically homogeneous.4
 Equally few are culturally homogeneous inasmuch as most societies
 sustain a variety of religions, languages, and forms of customary
 life. Matters are further complicated by the fact that ethnic and cul
 tural identities are not readily identifiable by looking to ascriptive
 characteristics. Identity is, to a considerable extent a matter of
 choice. In a Uberai democracy like the United States, for example,
 as Mary Waters has shown in Ethnic Options,5 ethnic intermarriage
 among the white population has not eliminated ethnic allegiances
 but has rather expanded the range of ethnicities people may choose
 to adopt. Many people of mixed ancestry have no option but to
 choose which ethnicity to adopt since there is no 'natural' course to
 take. And in many cases people take options which serve their
 interests.6
 The fundamental point is that ethnicity and culture are not static
 but constantly changing in response to economic, social and politi
 cal conditions. In looking at culturally pluralistic societies?that is
 to say, most societies?what we find are neither melting pots nor
 mosaics but ever-shifting kaleidoscopic patterns. In absolute terms,
 there are few if any stable cultural formations, since nearly all are
 affected not only by immigration and intermarriage but also by the
 trade in cultural products and information, and by the expansion of
 the world's largest industry: tourism.
 If all this is the case, the idea of societies trying to preserve some
 sort of cultural homogeneity looks implausible. Human history and
 the nature of modern societies suggest that pluralism is the norm
 and that homogeneity is simply not feasible.
 Even if homogeneity were feasible, however, this would not be to
 say that it is desirable. At least two kinds of arguments might be
 mounted against the pursuit of homogeneity, the first invoking the
 value of liberty and the second appealing to the importance of cul
 ture. The argument from liberty is that a measure of cultural homo
 geneity could only be bought at the cost of establishing a powerful
 (governmental) apparatus to enforce it (by compelling assimilation
 or ensuring the exclusion of outsiders). Individual liberty would be
 continued on page 4
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 curtailed insofar as some options would be closed off to people,
 and to the extent that individuals are compelled to adopt particular
 ways or practices.7 The argument from the importance of culture is
 that the pursuit of homogeneity will almost invariably be at the
 expense of minorities who wish to preserve their culture. In some
 of these cases at least the destruction or the wearing down of the
 minority culture may be extremely harmful to individuals unwilling
 or unable to assimilate into the wider society.8
 Moreover, in the light of historical experience, the arguments in
 favor of homogeneity do not seem especially compelling. The argu
 ment that cultural pluralism will lead to instability and violent con
 flict between cultures and ethnic communities appears to have
 some merit when one notes the numerous instances of such con
 flict. Yet on the other hand, the attempt to reorganize the world
 along national criteria has also led to violent conflict rather than the
 reign of peace, often at the
 granting special political rights to such minorities.)12
 The argument against cultural pluralism which has to be taken
 most seriously, however, is the argument put by Rousseau and
 those whom he inspired. This is the argument that a certain mea
 sure of homogeneity is necessary for the preservation of a political
 community. To answer this challenge, however, we need to look
 more generally at the arguments for cultural pluralism and to draw
 out the implications for the nature of a multicultural society. The
 question of whether a society should be culturally pluralistic or
 multicultural is not really an issue: modern societies, for the most
 part, simply are multicultural. The important question is, what
 kinds of institutions should govern a multicultural society.
 The answer to this question, I suggest, will depend upon the
 answer to the question of what kinds of institutions should govern
 pluralist societies generally. Multiculturalism or cultural pluralism
 is, in the end, one kind of pluralism. So we should begin by asking
 what exactlv is pluralism. There
 expense of the most innocent
 and vulnerable.9 In part the
 emergence of such conflict
 simply reflects the heterogene
 ity of apparently homogeneous
 groups. For example, in the
 former Indian state of Madras,
 cleavages within the Telugu
 speaking population were not
 very important. Yet as soon as
 a Telugu-speaking state was
 carved out of Madras, Telugu
 The question of whether a society
 should be culturally pluralistic or
 multicultural is not really an issue:
 modern societies, for the most part,
 simply are multicultural. The
 important question is, what kinds of
 institutions should govern a
 multicultural society.
 are many respects in which a soci
 ety might be pluralistic.13 First, it
 might exhibit the cultural plural
 ism of the kind discussed here.
 Second, it might exhibit a demo
 graphic pluralism inasmuch as
 human activities are importantly
 shaped by such factors as age, gen
 der, social role (eldest son, spouse)
 or geographical (urban or rural)
 location. Third, in most societies
 there is usually a pluralism of
 subgroups quickly emerged as
 political entities.10 Moves toward an imagined homogeneity do not
 mean a move away from conflict.
 The argument that ethnic or cultural minorities are a danger to
 the state also seems unpersuasive, despite the claims of the states in
 question. As Maybury-Lewis observes, it is hard to see how the
 Miskito Indians of Nicaragua, or the Indians who form one percent
 of the Brazilian population really pose a threat to the state.11 There
 is little doubt, however, that the state has posed a considerable
 threat to such minorities.
 Even the argument advanced, for example, by John Arthur
 Roebuck in his advocacy of assimilation for French-Canadians, that
 cultural pluralism would lead to the erosion of rights and freedoms,
 is not in the end quite convincing. Provided cultural membership is
 not coerced, individuals often prefer to exercise the freedom of
 association upon which cultural pluralism rests. And there is no
 reason why those who are members of minority cultures should
 necessarily enjoy fewer rights or freedoms?although in some
 cases they may. (What is more likely is that, as members of a cul
 tural minority they will enjoy less political power. However, there
 are serious dangers in attempting to deal with this inequality by
 interests insofar as there are differ
 ences of ends (and the powers to pursue them) among a variety of
 occupations or professions (farmers and soldiers), or classes (the
 poor), or institutions (churches and armies). Fourth, a society may
 be characterized by political pluralism if there are opportunities for
 groups which share distinct moral views about what would be good
 for the polity to influence the shape of that polity. Fifth, there
 might be an element of psychological pluralism in a society if indi
 viduals are sufficiently diverse in nature that they possess different
 temperaments, skills and traits. Sixth, there might be intellectual or
 scientific pluralism if the society harbors a variety of explanatory
 systems. Finally, a society might be pluralistic because within it
 there are distinct and competing moral values or principles.
 What kinds of institutions are appropriate if societies are plural
 istic in some or all of these ways? If we assume that the pursuit of
 homogeneity is out of the question for reasons discussed earlier,
 then there are two main alternative paths that might be taken. The
 first alternative looks to give explicit political recognition to the
 different pluralist elements within society, regarding them all as
 deserving of representation or the opportunity to participate in the
 processes of governance. The second alternative does not explicitly
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 recognize these elements as legitimate participants in the political
 process but rather views individuals, with particular rights and free
 doms, as the primary actors in the public realm.
 I wish to argue for the second approach, placing much less
 emphasis on bringing the plurality of interests in society into the
 public domain as political actors. The implication of this view for
 multiculturalism is the rejection of interest-group pluralism of the
 sort advocated, for example, by D.L Jayasuriya.14
 Let me begin by considering some of the reasons why the first
 alternative might be attractive, before turning to offer arguments
 for rejecting it. The first reason why the explicit recognition of plu
 ralist elements looks attractive is that it seems to emphasize inclu
 siveness?other interests or values or approaches are not excluded
 but brought into public discourse.
 Secondly, and relatedly, this approach emphasizes the value of
 participation by the different elements of society in the shaping of
 Political institutions should, as far as
 possible, serve to allow these different
 that society. This is especially important to those who see great
 value in collective self-government. Third, this approach seems to
 give greater weight to minority interests, and especially their inter
 est in self-determination. Fourth, it has been argued that institutions
 which allow minority groups "to participate fully and exercise their
 rights in the broad public domain would facilitate social integration
 and encourag[e] a 'civic religion'"; indeed it would "facilitate the
 processes of nation building through a shared sense of a common
 destiny."15
 Finally, it has been argued that, while the polity 'requires' both
 psychological and moral pluralism, it cannot be simply left to
 chance for these to reproduce themselves. Thus Amelie Rorty avers
 that some kind of intervention is needed through a "sound system
 of education" to ensure some kind of balance or 'equilibrium' of
 pluralist elements. It cannot be left to the institutions of the private
 sphere (such as the family) to ensure the preservation of such val
 ues, so we need "central educative and formative" institutions com
 bined with mechanisms to "coordinate benefits to each group in a
 system of dynamic equilibrium."16
 The view I wish to develop in contrast to the group-participation
 approach is a view which resists according a specific place or role
 for the pluralist elements of society. Political institutions should, as
 far as possible, serve to allow these different elements to flourish
 but should not be in the business of enabling these elements or
 elements to flourish but should not be
 in the business of enabling these
 elements or interests to shape society.
 interests to shape society. This is not to say that political institu
 tions should suppress particular interests, nor is it to deny that the
 nature of society will inevitably be shaped in some way by the
 interests and values of its various components. It is simply to main
 tain that the role of political institutions should be neutral, as far as
 possible, as to how this happens.
 And I would suggest that the best prospect for this happening is
 for institutions to be designed, not to deal with the plurality of
 interests and values in society as they are manifested in particular
 groups or representatives, but rather to uphold particular individual
 rights and freedoms regardless of the particular interests or affilia
 tions of the individuals.
 To make this position a little clearer it might help to draw an
 analogy between my view and the view advanced by J.N. Figgis in
 respect of religious pluralism. Figgis maintained that if one accept
 ed religious and political pluralism, then the best kind of state had
 to be a secular state?a tolerant secular state which allowed reli
 gious groups to exist and order their own affairs without interfer
 ence. But at the same time, these groups could not try to force upon
 the society religious values or practices which had their origins in
 their own particular religious convictions. He wrote:
 We cannot claim liberty for ourselves, while at the same
 time proposing to deny it to others. If we are to cry 'hands
 off to the civil power in regard to such matters as marriage,
 doctrine, ritual, or the conditions of communion inside the
 Church?and it is the necessary condition of a free religious
 society that it should regulate these matters?then we must
 give up attempting to dictate the policy of the State in regard
 to the whole mass of its citizens.17
 For Figgis, "when judging political questions we should do so as
 citizens, and not as churchmen."18 In this regard, he made a very
 clear distinction between the public and the private domains of
 social life. The point I want to make about pluralism more general
 ly (and about cultural pluralism in particular) is very much Figgis'
 point. People from particular religious or cultural or intellectual or
 moral backgrounds should have every right and the freedom to
 speak or to play a role in public affairs. But they enjoy these rights
 and freedoms as individual citizens, rather than as members or rep
 resentatives of particular groups.
 Of course, they would also have the right to become involved in
 matters which affect the interests of (one or more of) the group(s)
 to which they belong. In some cases (though not always!) their
 opinions may have to be accorded greater respect because they are
 dealing with matters with which they are more familiar. In other
 cases, individuals may be moved to act to change the rules of the
 social game because those rules treat particular kinds of persons
 unjustly, and?as the ones directly harmed?they are in the best
 position to know this. But in the end, these opinions must be seen
 as having been advanced by individuals, and political institutions
 should protect not the right of some interest to be advanced or to
 5
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 influence the shape of society but the right of individuals, separate
 ly or in concert with others, to defend their interests or their politi
 cal views.
 In considering the case of multiculturalism or cultural pluralism,
 then, the view I am advancing is that there is no call for any partic
 ular cultural community be given explicit recognition and to play a
 special role in public affairs; nor is there a call for all cultural com
 munities to be granted explicit recognition. In short, there is no
 need for a policy on multiculturalism, any more than there is a need
 for a policy on religious pluralism.
 People from particular religious or
 cultural or intellectual or moral
 backgrounds should have every right
 and the freedom to speak or to play a
 role in public affairs. But they enjoy
 these rights and freedoms as
 individual citizens, rather than as
 members or representatives of
 particular groups.
 Yet, granted that this is one way of viewing the matter, what rea
 sons might be advanced for adopting this point of view? There are
 two main reasons I have to advance. The first is that, if our concern
 in a multicultural society is to preserve cultural pluralism, this is
 best done by institutions which protect individual rights and free
 doms rather than interests. The reason for making this claim is that,
 as I argued earlier, culture (and ethnicity) are not static but con
 stantly changing in response to economic, social and political con
 ditions. If cultural formations are unstable in this way, then to try to
 entrench them is to try to stifle pluralism by preserving the existing
 structure (or perhaps some preferred structure) of interest and
 power. It presumes that members of particular groups will always
 see their interests in terms of the interests of those groups, or sug
 gests that individuals may not (that is, should not be allowed to)
 reconstitute into quite different kinds of groups. In the end, this
 approach provides the greatest advantage to the dominant elites or
 majorities within such groups.19
 The second reason for adopting this point of view which empha
 sizes that, while we may regard ourselves as members of some par
 ticular culture in private, we should see ourselves as, and have only
 the rights of, citizens in public, is that putting ethnicity and culture
 into the public realm is not in the interests of particular cultural
 communities. Once the distinction between the public and the pri
 vate realm is broken down it will become more difficult for some
 cultural minorities to preserve what is distinctive and perhaps val
 ued in their societies. If certain cultural values or issues are not
 kept in the private realm but raised as matters of public concern,
 then it is always that some cultural minorities will lose the argu
 ment in the public forum, with the effect of forcing them to modify
 their own practices rather than changing those of the wider society.
 As Figgis suggested, those who want the civil power to keep its
 hands off such matters as marriage and other doctrines within their
 religions are best served by seeking to keep these matters within
 the private realm rather than seeking to shape a position for all
 society on these matters.
 In the end, I would suggest that in trying to preserve pluralism
 we are best served by trying to preserve norms of tolerance and
 respect for individual freedoms rather than by attempts to shape
 society in accordance with the interests of existing groups.20 And I
 would conclude that this, perhaps, gives us the answer to the worry
 raised by Rousseau: that a certain measure of homogeneity may be
 necessary to sustain a political community. A society on my view
 would be sufficiently homogeneous if it were able to sustain a com
 mitment to preserve norms of individual freedom and tolerance. If
 society needs a 'civil religion' reducible to a few dogmas, as
 Rousseau suggested, these commitments would be dogma enough.
 Chandran Kukathas teaches in the School of Politics in the
 University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force
 Academy.
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 National Conference on Fatherhood
 October 14-15,1996
 in Minneapolis
 The Institute for American Values, in collaboration with the Center of the American Experiment and
 the National Fatherhood Initiative, is co-sponsoring a conference on "The Fatherhood Movement: A
 Call to Action," on October 14-15, 1996 in Minneapolis. Hosted by the Center of the American
 Experiment, this conference will bring together 25 of the nation's leading experts on fatherhood to con
 sider public policy and cultural initiatives which address the growing problem of children who lack the
 presence and active involvement of a father in their lives.
 For more information, contact the Center of the American Experiment, (612) 338 3605.
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